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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk
In addition to the usual quota of treasury decisions, we publish this
month the committee on appeals and review memorandum No. 106 and the
subsequent explanation of the meaning of the words “actual value.”
The idea embodied in the memorandum has been found to be of great
interest to accountants, many of whom seemed to be of the opinion that
the taxing authorities were about to change the concept of invested capital
so as to include value as well as cost.
The subsequent explanatory memorandum clears this point but it will be
noted that the committee does recognize the fact that salvage value has
a bearing upon the subject.
The idea is most interesting and we recommend a careful study of
these memoranda.
(T. D. 3178—June 11, 1921)
Income tax—Revenue acts of 1916, 1917, 1918—Decision of court.
1. United States possessions—Constitutional provisions affecting
REVENUE LEGISLATION.

The power of congress, in the enactment of revenue legislation applicable

to the possessions of the United States, is not restricted by the uniformity
and apportionment provisions of the constitution, as it acts in the premises
under the authority of paragraph 2, section 3, article IV, of the constitution,
which clothes congress with power to make all needful rules and regulations
respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.
2. Persons taxable under revenue act of 1918.
The revenue act of 1918 taxes the income of every individual, a citizen
or resident of the United States, without respect to whether such individual
had been subject to taxation under the revenue acts of 1916 and 1917;
congress did not, by using the words “in lieu of” in the revenue act of 1918,
mean to tax only those incomes of individuals who had been subject to
taxation under the two prior acts.
3. Repeal of revenue act of 1916, as amended, as applied to Philippine
Islands.
The revenue act of 1916, as amended by the revenue act of 1917, was not
repealed, in so far as it applied to the Philippine Islands, by the revenue act
of 1918, but was continued in force, except as might be otherwise provided
by the local legislature.
4. United States citizens resident in Philippine Islands—Liability
TO TAX.

A citizen of the United States who resided in the Philippine Islands
during the year 1918 is subject to the tax imposed by the revenue act
of 1918.
5. Credit for taxes paid in the Philippine Islands.
A citizen of the United States, resident in the Philippine Islands, is
entitled to a credit for the amount of taxes paid to the Philippine Islands
during the calendar year, under section 222 of the revenue act of 1918.

(T. D. 3183—June 24, 1921)
Excess-profits tax—Revenue act of 1917—Decision of court.
1. Invested capital—Section 207—Earned surplus expended in improv
ing INTANGIBLE ASSET.

Where the earnings of a corporation have been spent in improving a
secret chemical process (admitted to be an intangible asset), the increased
value of the process due to the improvement effected by such expenditure
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is to be included in estimating “earned surplus used in the business,” as an
element of “invested capital,” as defined by section 207.
2. Same.
This is also true in a case where the improvement was originally paid
for with borrowed money, and where subsequent earnings were sufficiently
large to repay the borrowed money and to create before the beginning of
the taxable year an “earned surplus.”
3. Nominal capital—Section 209.
Under the facts of this case, a corporation having an earned surplus
used in the business, amounting to $2,000, is not “a corporation having no
invested capital or not more than a nominal capital,” within the meaning
of section 209.
The appended decision of the United States district court for the
southern district of New York, dated April 19, 1921, in the case of
Lincoln Chemical Co. v. Edwards, collector, is published for the infor
mation of revenue officers and others concerned.
United States District Court, Southern District of New York.
Lincoln Chemical Co., plaintiff, v. William H. Edwards, as collector, etc.
[Apr. 19, 1921.]
Action by a taxpayer against the collector for refund of a part of the
excess-profits tax for 1917. The plaintiff, a domestic corporation, filed
its return for 1917 and calculated its capital upon the basis of section 209
of the law of October 3, 1917; that is to say, it assumed that it had “no
invested capital or not more than a nominal capital.” The treasury officials
reassessed the tax at a larger figure upon a basis not now necessary to set
forth, because it is conceded that the propriety of their action depends
upon the correctness of the plaintiff’s reading of section 209. If that is
right, the plaintiff wins; if it is wrong, the defendant.
The case was tried before a jury of one and at the conclusion of the
evidence both sides moved for the direction of a verdict. The evidence,
which was undisputed, showed the following state of facts: The plaintiff
was organized in April, 1909, under the laws of New York with a capital
stock of $10,000. There were but two persons financially interested in it,
Loeb and Riddle. Riddle was an inventor, and before the incorporation
came to Loeb with a process for extracting cocoa butter out of cocoa shells,
a by-product. This process proved worthless, and Riddle thereupon sug
gested to Loeb the possibility of converting the process into one from
which he could extract from cocoa shells a chemical substance, known as
theobromine, allied to caffeine. Loeb, having some money, continued to
advance it in defraying Riddle’s further experiments, until he became
fearful of too wide involvement, and determined to incorporate the venture.
Riddle agreed to work for the corporation for five years at a salary of
$1,800 and to convey his process, still unperfected, both for $2,400 par
value of the plaintiff’s stock. Loeb agreed to convey the machinery and
supplies par for par in stock, $7,400, and $200 was paid in cash.
During the year 1910 the company borrowed nearly $20,000, which it
spent in Riddle’s further experiments upon the process which was then
complete. During that year it got one, Schaefer, a manufacturing chemist,
to make a contract for the exploitation of the process on a royalty basis,
but the sales of theobromine were so few that the royalty was never earned.
In 1912 they got Schaefer to give them better terms; he agreed to pay $2,000
a year for the process over a period of 15 years and to furnish theobromine
to the plaintiff at $2.50 a pound or less. This gave the plaintiff control
of a supply without manufacturing. At the time of the first contract in
1910 the plaintiff sold all its machinery and plant to Schaefer for $1,155
and its supplies for $407, and this money was either used in development
or upon the indebtedness. In any event, it had all disappeared before 1914.
The plaintiff never manufactured any theobromine after 1910.
The plaintiff’s profits on the sale of theobromine made by Schaefer under
the process were not large throughout the year 1911, but they began to
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increase in 1912 and 1913, and the company thus made a small income
besides the royalty paid by Schaefer. The advent of the great war in 1914
greatly increased the demand, and the business became very profitable,
so that by January 1, 1917, all its debts were paid and it had a surplus of
$13,000 after writing off a depreciation of $7,700 upon the process.
The business was done as follows: There were but three purchasers
of theobromine, all large manufacturing chemists, who bought at 10 days
cash. The plaintiff necessarily bought all its theobromine (made under
the process) from Schaefer at 15 days cash, and was therefore in a
position to pay Schaefer out of the moneys which its customers paid for it.
As these were of high financial responsibility it had no need to hold a
reserve in its treasury in order to finance its purchases, though at times,
when in ample funds, it did use its surplus to pay Schaefer before the
customers paid for their consignments.
During the year 1917 the assets of the plaintiff, therefore, consisted only
of its cash on hand, the contract with Schaefer, and the secret process
finally perfected by Riddle. Its stock was $10,000, and its surplus, as
stated, $13,000, of which over $7,000 was in cash. It necessarily followed
that its other assets were valued at $16,000.
The case depends upon the meaning of the phrase “invested capital”
and “nominal capital” as used in section 209 and as defined in section 207.
The plaintiff asserts that there was only $200 of cash paid in, no tangibles
remaining after 1913, no surplus “used and employed” in the business,
and that the secret process was an “intangible” which must be taken at
its “actual cash value" in April, 1909, which is shown to be nothing. The
defendant argues that the sums spent upon the process, which did, in fact,
increase its value by $19,000, should be taken as a surplus “used and em
ployed” in the business.
Hand, district judge: I shall decide this case upon the assumption
that “nominal capital” in section 209 means “nominal invested capital,”
without of course passing upon that question. I shall further assume—
and indeed on this point both sides agree—that the secret process of Riddle
was “intangible property” within the meaning of section 207 (a) (3) (b).
I shall finally assume that the process had only a nominal value in April,
1909, when it was sold to the plaintiff for $2,400 of stock. With these
assumptions the question arises whether the money used to develop the
process can be regarded as “paid in or earned surplus and undivided profits
used or employed in the business” under section 209 (a) (3). On the
trial I thought that the plaintiff was right on this point, and for clarity I
shall therefore state its arguments as strongly as I can. The statute,
it says, prescribes that “intangible property” of this kind “shall be included
in invested capital at a value not to exceed the actual cash value at the
time of such purchase.” Disregarding “paid in surplus,” of which there
is none here, the “earned surplus” is the only item into which the supposed
added value of the process can be placed. Now surplus, or at least “earned
surplus” is merely an accountant’s way of saying that the value of the
assets are greater than the liabilities. When the statute speaks of “invested
capital,” it must be understood to refer to existing property, i. e., “means
of production,” and to use accountant’s language', not because accounts can
ever of themselves be the basis of taxation, but because they are the most
convenient record of actual values, embodied in property which is alone
the proper basis of taxation. “Earned surplus” must therefore represent
the value of existing property.
This being true, continues the plaintiff, the only asset of value in 1917
was the perfected process and we may assume that it had enough value
to give more than a “nominal” “earned surplus” above the capital stock,
which was the only liability. Therefore, if the asset could be taken at its
true value in 1917, section 209 of the statute would not apply. The difficulty
with the collector’s position however is that section 207 directed us to
include the process at no more than its “actual cash value” in 1909, and
at that time it had none. The money spent in improving and perfecting
the process had, in 1917, no existence at all, save in the process itself.
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It was spent in machinery or supplies or Riddle’s living expenses, or salaries.
So far as our treasury was concerned there was nothing now left except
the process. That was therefore the only asset which could figure on the
credit side of our account to establish any “earned surplus,” and the statute
forbade its inclusion at anything but a nominal value. Therefore, we had
no “earned surplus,” and only a “nominal invested capital.”
This argument appears to me unanswerable if the incompleted process
be regarded as the same asset for all purposes when finally developed as
when first acquired. The statute must of course mean something, and
the least that it can mean must be, I think, that any automatic increase
in value of a process or “other intangible property” must be disregarded.
“The unearned increment,” as economists would call it, will be ignored.
Therefore, I should altogether disregard any increase in the value of this
process dependent upon general conditions of industry, as for example the
rise in the price of theobromine due to the great war. Furthermore, for
the purposes of this case anyway, I may assume that an increase in the
value of the process, resulting from spending money in advertising or the
like, which leaves it unchanged in itself, will fall into the same category.
That question can await decision till it arises; I say nothing about it here.
The case at bar is, however, one where money has been spent in changing
the property itself, so that in place of a formula which prescribed one
sequence of steps, there emerged another which prescribed a different
sequence. Fair analogies appear to me, for example, cattle fed for market,
or houses rebuilt or enlarged. It is true that for convenience we speak
of such property as always remaining the same, though in fact it is not
only different in value, but that difference results from a change in the
objective character of the property itself, but that convenience should not
disguise the substantial fact that it is, economically speaking, new property
which appears.
When such changes have resulted from the expenditure of new capital,
I see no reason why the statute should be construed as peremptorily direct
ing that they should be disregarded. It is quite true still, as the plaintiff
argues, that the “earned surplus” must be found in some assets and that
the only asset in the case at bar still remains the process, but it is a
different process. The limitation of section 207 may be confined, without
undue violence to the sense of the words, to such increases in value as
arise without the addition of new capital, and it may be, to such others
also as involve no objective change in the thing itself.
Indeed, it can scarcely be supposed that congress could have had any
other purpose than to prevent the taxpayer from crediting his capital
account with increases which he had done nothing to produce. If they
meant to include also new outlays upon existing capital, no matter how
providently made, the statute provides a direct incentive to extravagance.
Often, perhaps generally, it is a sound industrial policy to improve existing
capital, rather than to scrap it, and invest anew. Yet if the plaintiff be
right, no such investment can ever do more than meet depreciation, and
this would apply as well to “tangibles” as to “intangibles.” The only new
values which could be recognized would be in property bought outright
after incorporation, and those investments which may have been the means
of changing the industrial character and value of existing property, would
be totally lost for purposes of taxation. When taxes can be as high as
the excess-profits tax may be, such inducements may become a patent
influence upon industrial conduct, and it can not be supposed that the result
of the plaintiff’s construction was within the purposes of congress.
Again, it should be a weighty consideration with me that the tax bureau
has made these allowances in the past in the case of thousands of tax
payers and has drafted its regulations upon the assumption that the statute
permits them. I therefore hold that when money has been earned and spent
in improving a process such as this, its increased value due only to that
expenditure may figure as an asset in estimating under section 207 "earned
surplus,” if any, as an element of “invested capital.”
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It does not follow of course in the case at bar that the value of the
process so improved was enough to cause any “earned surplus” to emerge.
That depends upon whether the assets, so estimated, were greater than
the stock, $10,000, by more than a “nominal” amount. Now the value of
the “tangibles” must under section 207 be taken as of January 1, 1914, at
which time they had disappeared. Therefore, the process must have
increased from its nominal value in 1909 to more than $10,000 before any
“earned surplus” could begin to appear at all. The value at which the
plaintiff carried the process does not definitely appear on its books. On
January 1, 1917, it had a surplus of $13,088.59 and therefore assets of
$23,088.59. Of this, $7,367.64 was in cash, leaving $15,720.95 for other
assets which must be the process and the contract. The contract got its
value only from the process and may be disregarded. The value of the
process as of that year would therefore appear to be this sum.
This figure, it is true, does not correspond with other evidence and
apparently is incorrect. In its income-tax return for 1916 it valued the
process as of March 1, 1913, at $19,716.84, and claimed a deduction for
depreciation to date of $7,761.42, leaving a value of about $12,000 as of
January 1, 1917. The discrepancy of some $3,700 I have been unable to
account for except upon the hypothesis that there were other assets not
shown. Perhaps the cash was greater, because the cashbook showed a
balance on January 2, 1917, of $11,000, which just about makes up the
difference.
Assuming that this is the proper explanation, still on the
plaintiff’s own admission it had an “earned surplus” of $2,000, which in
view of the size of the business I should not consider “nominal.”
But the defendant was not bound by the plaintiff’s admission. It was
for the plaintiff to prove that it had only a nominal capital. The process
was clearly of very substantial value. The contract had 10 years more to
run and there was a minimum royalty of $2,000. Besides this the plaintiff
could call for at least 3,000 pounds of theobromine yearly at not more
than $2.50 a pound, a right which had been of substantial value in the
years before the war began to affect the price. In 1914 this right was worth
$525 and the royalty apparently $2,854. Moreover, when the contract ter
minated the process would not necessarily become worthless. Indeed, it
may have a very substantial value for an indefinite time. The plaintiff has
certainly failed to prove that its value in 1917 over $10,000 was “not more
than nominal.”
I therefore conclude that the case is not proved and will direct a verdict
for the defendant.
(T. D. 3188—June 30, 1921)
Income returns—Copies of.
Regulations governing the furnishing of copies of income returns for use
of attorneys connected with the department of justice—Amending T. D.
2962 and article 1091 (a), paragraph 1, regulations No. 45 (1920 edition).
Section 1, paragraph 1, of the rules and regulations governing the
furnishing of copies of income returns contained in T. D. 2962, and article
1091 (a), paragraph 1, regulations No. 45 (1920 edition), is amended to
read as follows:
The original income return of an individual, partnership, corporation,
association, joint-stock company, insurance company or fiduciary, or a
copy thereof, may be furnished by the commissioner of internal revenue
to a United States attorney for use as evidence before a United States
grand jury or in litigation in any court, where the United States is inter
ested in the result, or for use in the preparation for such litigation, or to
an attorney connected with the department of justice designated to handle
such matters, upon written request of the attorney general, the assistant
to the attorney general, or an assistant attorney general. When an income
return or copy thereof is thus furnished, it must be limited in use to the
purpose for which it is furnished and is under no conditions to be made
public except where publicity necessarily results from such use. In case
the original return is necessary, it shall be placed in evidence by the com
missioner of internal revenue or by some other officer or employee of the
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internal revenue bureau designed by the commissioner for that purpose, and
after it has been placed in evidence it shall be returned to the files in
the office of the commissioner in Washington. An original return will be
furnished only in exceptional cases, and then only when it is made to appear
that the ends of justice may otherwise be defeated. Neither the original
nor a copy of an income return, desired for use in litigation in court where
the United States government is not interested in the result and where
such use might result in making public the information contained therein,
will be furnished, except as otherwise provided in the next succeeding
paragraph.
(T. D. 3193—July 1, 1921)
Income tax—Act of October 3, 1913—Decision of court.
1. Statutory construction—Words "no matter how created or organ
ized”—Relation back to words "every corporation, joint-stock
COMPANY OR ASSOCIATION."

The words “no matter how created or organized” in section II, para
graph G (a), of the act apply not only to insurance companies, but relate
back to the words “every corporation, joint-stock company or association,”
so that what is meant is that all such concerns (not including partnerships)
are included and are taxable.
2. Trusts—Organization indirectly controlled by shareholders—Asso
ciation.
An organization, in form a trust, created by an agreement of the stock
holders of several street railway corporations desiring to effect a unitary
control of the properties of such corporations, is an association within sec
tion II, paragraph G (a), of the act, where the agreement uses language
that reads much like the state corporation law, and superimposes that or
ganization upon the several corporations by placing the legal title to the
capital stock of those corporations in the trustees named, who are to do
certain specified things only, and by providing for a committee which con
trols even the power of the trustees to vote the capital stock of the cor
porations, and which is elected and controlled by what are called partici
pating shareholders, who hold certificates of common and preferred partici
pating shares issued by the trustees in lieu of the capital stocks of the
corporations.
3. Association—Organization not under statute—Effect on taxability.
An association may be organized independently of any statute, and
when so organized is nevertheless subject to income tax as such.
4. Same—Exemption from tax as partnership.
The association is not an ordinary partnership, hence is not exempt
as a partnership from the income tax on corporations, joint-stock com
panies, and associations imposed by section II, paragraph G (a), of the act.
The appended decision of the district court of the United States, northern
district of Illinois, eastern division, rendered March 14, 1921, in the case of
Chicago Title & Trust Co., as trustee, v. Smietanka, collector, is published
for the information of internal revenue officers and others concerned.
District court of the United States, northern district of Illinois,
EASTERN DIVISION.

Chicago Title & Trust Co., as trustee of the Chicago City & Connecting
Railways Collateral Trust, v. Smietanka, collector.
[Mar. 14, 1921.]
Page, district judge: Persons owning capital stock of five street rail
ways in Chicago, desiring to effect a unitary control of the properties,
executed the agreement out of which grows the question here, viz., Did
that agreement create a joint-stock company or association, taxable under
section II, G (a) of the federal revenue act of 1913? Such a tax was
paid by the plaintiff under protest, and it brings this (and four similar
suits) against the defendant, a former internal-revenue collector, to recover
the money paid on the ground that it was an illegal tax.
The question arises upon a demurrer to the declaration.

290

Income-tax Department
It is strongly urged upon the court that this case presents a trust similar
to what is known as the Massachusetts trust, and that it comes within the
purview of and is governed by Crocker v. Malley (249 U. S., 223). How
ever, I find that it has features which show it to be quite different from the
Crocker case. The supreme court in that case said:
The trust that has been described would not fall within any familiar
conception of a joint-stock association.
And
If we assume that the words “no matter how created or organized”
apply to “association” and not only to “insurance company,” still it would
be a wide departure from normal usage to call the beneficiaries here a
joint-stock association when they are admitted not to be partners in any
sense, and when they had no joint action or interest and no control over
the fund. On the other hand, the trustees by themselves can not be a
joint association within the meaning of the act unless all trustees with
discretionary powers are such. * * * We perceive no ground for grouping
the two—beneficiaries and trustees—together in order to turn them into
an association by uniting their contrasted functions and powers, although
they are in no proper sense associated.
In Eliot v. Freeman (220 U. S., 186) the court said:
The language of the act of 1909, “now or hereafter organized under
the laws of the United States,” imports an organization deriving power
from statutory enactment.
Section 38 of the act of 1909 reads:
That every corporation, joint-stock company, or association organized
for profit and having a capital stock represented by shares, and every
insurance company, now or hereafter organized under the laws of the
United States, or of any state or territory of the United States, or under
the acts of congress applicable to Alaska, etc., shall be subject to pay
annually, * * ♦.
The act of 1913 reads:
That the normal tax * * *shall be levied, assessed, and paid annually
upon the entire net income arising or accruing * * *during the preceding
calendar year to every corporation, joint-stock company, or association,
and every insurance company organized in the United States, no matter
how created or organized, not including partnerships.
It is contended that the words “no matter how organized” in the act
of 1913 relate to insurance companies only, but the court is of the opinion
that those words relate back to the words “every corporation, joint-stock
company, or association,” so that what is meant is that all such concerns
(not including partnerships) are included and are taxable. (Eliot v.
Freeman, supra.)
There are material differences between the so-called trust in this case
and the trust in Crocker v. Malley. The trustees here, except for certain
fixed things, are not principals at all, but are mere agents of the committee
hereinafter referred to. The parties who conceived and drew up the agree
ment in question simply built up an organization by the use of language
that reads in many respects much like the old corporation law of Illinois.
They superimposed that organization upon the four or five corporations
owning the street railway system of the city of Chicago by placing the
legal title to the capital stock of those corporations in the trustees named,
who are to do certain specified things only, and by providing for a com
mittee, which controls even the power of the trustees to vote the capital
stock of the street railway companies. This committee is elected by what
is called participating shareholders, who hold certificates of common and
preferred participating shares issued by the trustees in lieu of the capital
stocks, of the corporations. The whole agreement is shot through with
provisions for control by the committee, particularly upon page 25—
And from time to time the trustees may give proxies to any person or
persons to vote such stock; but in voting upon any of such stock the
trustees shall follow the directions or instructions, if any, that may be
given to the trustees by the committee.
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And again, on page 30, where it undertakes to enumerate the powers
of the trustees, they use this language—
Subject to any rights of the trustees of the said collateral trust inden
ture dated January 3, 1910, as specified therein, and subject to the terms
of the written approval or consent of the committee in any case where under
the terms of this trust agreement such approval or consent is authorized or
required, the trustees shall have such power, etc.
Again—
To invest at any time * * *any sum or sums * * *which the committee
may approve.
And again, in (i), to—
Vote upon any of the shares, constituting any part of the deposited
securities, in favor of any lawful consolidation, merger, or reorganization
of the properties, franchises, or shares of any of the companies ♦ * *
upon such terms and conditions as shall be approved by both the committee
and the trustees.
In Crocker v. Malley, the supreme court does not undertake to say
whether there could be such a thing as an association not organized under
some law; but I am of the opinion that there can be such an association
and that the organization here shown is within the statute.
It is claimed by counsel that if any organization ever becomes an
association it thereby necessarily becomes a partnership, but there are,
in my opinion, certain limitations and conditions that prevent the agreement
here from creating an ordinary partnership.
The demurrer is sustained.
TREASURY RULINGS
A. R. M. 106.

Section 326, article 839: Surplus and undivided profits: allowance for
depletion and depreciation.
There is no authority for reducing earned surplus because of alleged
failure to charge off sufficient depreciation in the past unless the depre
ciable assets of the corporation are valued on its books at the beginning of
the taxable year at an amount in excess of their actual value at that time.
Section 326, article 839: Surplus and undivided profits: allowance for
depletion and depreciation.
A. R. M. 106 EXPLAINED.

Specific inquiry has been made as to the meaning of the words "actual
value” as used in committee on appeals and review memorandum 106. For
the purposes of taxation depreciation is based upon cost. Accordingly the
words “actual value” mean “sound value,” which is “original cost” (or
value as of March 1, 1913, if applicable), including additions and better
ments charged to capital account, less depreciation sustained.
Article 161, regulations 45 (1920 edition), defines the proper allowance
for depreciation as “that amount which should be set aside for the taxable
year in accordance with a consistent plan by which the aggregate of such
amounts for the useful life of the property in the business will suffice,
with the salvage value, at the end of such useful life to provide in place of
the property its cost, or its value as of March 1, 1913, if acquired by the
taxpayer before that date.”
It follows from this definition that any action on the part of a par
ticular taxpayer which extends the useful life of a depreciable asset beyond
the normal or usual term, and any circumstance which serves to increase
the salvage value of a depreciable asset, operates to justify a reduction in
the normal rate of depreciation. The depreciation of an asset is arrested
where it is maintained at a high standard of efficiency either by the exer
cise of unusual care in its use or by unusual maintenance expenditures.
Invested capital, as defined in the excess-profits tax law, is a statutory
concept and is composed of two elements: (a) original contribution, and
(b) earnings of the corporation available for distribution but not dis
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tributed and not dissipated by subsequent operating losses. The exhaus
tion of this capital through use, wear and tear has, for the purpose of com
puting invested capital, the same effect as an operating loss, and unless
this loss is properly taken care of out of earnings in one way or another
earned surplus must be adjusted in accordance with the provisions of the
regulations. There are two ways of taking care of this loss out of income.
One is by charging ordinary repairs directly to expense and setting up a
depreciation reserve against which are properly chargeable all renewals
and replacements; the other is where renewals and replacements, as well
as repairs, have been charged directly against gross income. Either way
has the effect of reducing the amount added during the year to earned
surplus. Consequently, the mere fact that no depreciation, or a minimum
depreciation, has been charged as such is not sufficient reason for reducing
the earned surplus where renewals and replacements sufficient to care for
the decrease in value of capital assets have been charged directly to expense,
or where for any of the other reasons hereinbefore suggested less than the
normal rate of depreciation is properly chargeable. When a taxpayer makes
this claim there are two methods of verifying it. One is by determining
the plant efficiency and the other is by determining the value of the capital
assets remaining. From an administrative standpoint the latter is probably
more practical even though it may be said that the former is more accurate.
Many cases have been brought to the attention of the committee where
corporations have been in existence for a long period of years, some of
which corporations have been in existence several times the ordinary esti
mated life of the depreciable assets, and yet those assets are to-day in
first-class condition and worth the figure at which they are carried on
the books, although no depreciation has been charged as such and no addi
tions to capital account have been made. In such cases it is obvious that
depreciation has been adequately cared for by charges to expense, although
it frequently happens that it is impossible at this late date to segregate
and specify such charges and there is no warrant in the law or the regu
lations for requiring the depreciable assets in such cases to be written
down below the figure at which they are carried on the books, since to do
so is to reduce earned surplus twice, once through the original charge to
expense (whether proper or improper) and again through an arbitrary
depreciation charge required by the bureau to be set up against earned
surplus for the purpose of computing invested capital.
The controlling rule in this matter is found in that part of article 839
of regulations 45, which reads:
Adjustments in respect of depreciation or depletion in prior years
will be made or permitted only upon the basis of affirmative evidence
that as at the beginning of the taxable year the amount of depreciation
or depletion written off in prior years was insufficient or excessive, as
the case may be.
Mere failure in prior years to have written off on the books the maxi
mum or ordinary rate of depreciation is not in itself "affirmative evidence."
There is no warrant for reducing earned surplus because of alleged failure
to charge off sufficient depreciation in the past, unless the depreciable
assets of the corporation are valued on its books at the beginning of the
taxable year at an amount in excess of their sound value at that time.
(T. D. 3195—July 13, 1921.)
Income tax—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of Supreme Court.
Deductions—Federal Estate Tax Paid by Executor.
Federal estate tax paid by executors of an estate is an allowable de
duction, under section 214, in ascertaining the net taxable income of the
estate for the year in which said estate tax “accrued,” which means became
due.
The appended decision of the supreme court of the United States,
dated June 6, 1921, in the case of United States v. Alan H. Wood
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ward et al., executors of Joseph H. Woodward, deceased, affirming the
judgment of the court of claims, is published for the information of in
ternal revenue officers and others concerned.
Supreme Court of the United States, No. 811. October Term, 1920.
United States, appellant, v. Alan H. Woodward et al., executors, etc.
Appeal from the Court of Claims.
[June 6, 1921.]
Mr. Justice Van Devanter delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the executors of Joseph
H. Woodward, deceased, for money claimed to have been erroneously ex
acted from them as a tax on the income of his estate while in their hands.
The testator died December 15, 1917. The revenue act of 19161 “imposed
upon the transfer of the net estate of every decedent” dying thereafter a
tax which it called an “estate tax.” The act fixed the amount of the tax at
a named percentage “of the value of the net estate,” made the tax a lien
upon the “entire gross estate,” required that it be paid “out of the estate”
before distribution, declared that it should “be due one year after the de
cedent’s death,” charged the executor or administrator with the duty of
paying it, and declared that the receipt therefor should entitle him to a
credit for the amount in the usual settlement of his accounts. Under that
act these executors were required to pay an estate tax of $489,834.07. The
tax became due December 15, 1918, and they paid it February 8, 1919.
Shortly thereafter the executors made a return, under the revenue act of
1918,2 of the income of the testator’s estate for the taxable year 1918 and
claimed in the return that in ascertaining the net income for that year the
estate tax of $489,834.07 should be deducted. The commissioner of internal
revenue refused to allow the deduction and assessed an income tax of
$165,075.78 against the estate. Had the deduction been allowed there would
have been no taxable net income for that year and no part of the $165,075.78
would have been collectible. Payment of that sum, as so assessed, was
pressed on the executors and they paid it under duress. Then after taking
the necessary steps to entitle them to do so, they brought this suit in the
court of claims to recover the money thus exacted from them.
The sole question for decision is, was the estate tax paid by the execu
tors, and claimed by them as a deduction in the income-tax return for the
year 1918, an allowable deduction in ascertaining the net taxable income
of the estate for that year? The court of claims held that it was.
(—Ct. Cls.,—.)
The solution of the question turns entirely upon the statutory provisions
under which the two taxes were severally collected. The act of 1918, by
sections 210, 211, and 219, subjects the net income “received by estates of
deceased persons during the period of administration or settlement” to an
income tax measured by fixed percentages thereof; by sections 212 and 219
requires that the net income be ascertained by taking the gross income, as
defined in section 213, and making the deductions named in section 214,
and by section 214 makes express provision for the deduction of “taxes
paid or accrued within the taxable year imposed (a) by the authority of
the United States, except income, war-profits and excess-profits taxes.”
This last provision is the important one here. It is not ambiguous, but
explicit, and leaves little room for construction. The words of its major
clause are comprehensive and include every tax which is charged against
the estate by the authority of the United States. The excepting clause spe
cifically enumerates what is to be expected. The implication from the
latter is that the taxes which it enumerates would be within the major
clause were they not expressly excepted, and also that there was no purpose
to except any others. Estate taxes were as well known at the time the
provision was framed as the ones particularly excepted. Indeed, the same
1 Ch. 463, Title II, 89 Stat., 777; ch. 159, Title III, 89 Stat., 1002; ch. 63, Title IX,
40 Stat., 324.
2 Ch. 18, Title II, secs. 210-214, 219, 1405, 40 Stat., 1062-1067, 1071, 1151.
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act, by sections 400-410, expressly provides for their continued imposition
and enforcement. Thus their omission from the excepting clause means
that Congress did not intend to except them.
The act of 1916 calls the estate tax a “tax” and particularly denomi
nates it an “estate tax.” This court recently has recognized that it is a
duty or excise and is imposed in the exertion of the taxing power of the
United States.—New York Trust Co. v. Eisner (— U. S., —). It is made
a charge on the estate and is to be paid out of it by the administrator or
executor substantially as other taxes and charges are paid. It becomes
due not at the time of the decedent’s death, as suggested by counsel for the
government, but one year thereafter, as the statute plainly provides. It
does not segregate any part of the estate from the rest and keep it from
passing to the administrator or executor for purposes of administration,
as counsel contend, but is made a general charge on the gross estate and
is to be paid in money out of any available funds or, if there be none, by
converting other property into money for the purpose.
Here the estate tax not only “accrued,” which means became due,
during the taxable year of 1918, but it was paid before the income for that
year was returned or required to be returned. When the return was made
the executors claimed a deduction by reason of that tax. We hold that
under the terms of the act of 1918 the deduction should have been allowed.
Judgment affirmed.
(T. D. 3200—July 19, 1921.)
Excess-profits tax—Revenue act of 1917—Decision of court.
1. Rate of Tax—“Amount of the Net Income in Excess of the De
duction."
“The amount of the net income in excess of the deduction,” as used
in section 201, means that, where the deduction does not exceed 15 per
cent. of the invested capital, the first of the graduated percentages of
tax is to be 20 per cent. of the difference between the deduction and 15
per cent. of the invested capital.
2. Constitutionality of Act.
The construction placed on section 201 by the regulations of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue does not render the law unconstitu
tional as preventing uniformity and equality in the application of the tax.
The appended decision of the district court of the United States for the
eastern district of Pennsylvania, in the case of Ehret Magnesia Manufac
turing Co. v. Ephraim Lederer, collector, is published for the information
of internal revenue officers and others concerned.
District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. No. 7044.
Ehret Magnesia Manufacturing Co. v. Ephraim Lederer, collector of
internal revenue for the first district of Pennsylvania.
Upon trial before the court without a jury.
[June sessions, 1920.]
Thompson, Judge: The plaintiff brought suit to recover the sum of
$23,889.94, the amount of taxes alleged to have been unlawfully assessed
and collected by the defendant. The taxes were paid under protest and
petition for a refund was rejected by the Commissioner of Internal Reve
nue. The facts are not in dispute. The tax was assessed upon excess
profits under the provisions of section 201 of title II of the act of
October 3, 1917 (40 Stat., 302). The applicable provisions of the act are
as follows:
Title II—War Excess-Profits Tax.
Definitions:
The term “taxable year” means the twelve months ending December
thirty-first.
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The term “pre-war period” means the calendar years nineteen hundred
and eleven, nineteen hundred and twelve, and nineteen hundred and thirteen.
Sec. 201. That in addition to the taxes under existing law and under
this act there shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid for each taxable
year upon the income of every corporation, partnership, or individual a
tax (hereinafter in this title referred to as the tax) equal to the following
percentages of the net income:
Twenty per centum of the amount of the net income in excess of the
deduction determined as hereinafter provided, and not in excess of fifteen
per centum of the invested capital for the taxable year;
Twenty-five per centum of the amount of the net income in excess of
fifteen per centum and not in excess of twenty per centum of such capital;
Thirty-five per centum of the amount of the net income in excess of
twenty per centum and not in excess of twenty-five per centum of such
capital;
Forty-five per centum of the amount of the net income in excess of
twenty-five per centum and not in excess of thirty-three per centum of
such capital; and
Sixty per centum of the amount of the net income in excess of thirtythree per centum of such capital.
Sec. 203. That for the purposes of this title the deduction shall be as
follows, except as otherwise in this title provided—
(a) In the case of a domestic corporation, the sum of (1) an amount
equal to the same percentage of the invested capital for the taxable year
which the average amount of the annual net income of the trade or business
during the pre-war period was of the invested capital for the pre-war
period (but not less than seven or more than nine per centum of the in
vested capital for the taxable year), and (2) $3,000; * * *
There is no dispute that the net income of the plaintiff for the year
ending December 31, 1917, was $422,445.58. The invested capital for the
taxable year was $672,631.28. The deduction to which the plaintiff was
entitled under section 201 was, as ascertained by section 203 (a), 9 per
cent. of the invested capital representing the highest average profit during
the pre-war period allowed by the act, and amounted to $60,536.82, and
with the specific deduction of $3,000 to $63,536.82.
A statement showing the items upon which the tax is to be computed
is, therefore, as follows:
Invested capital for the year ................................
Net income for taxable year ................................
Average profit pre-war period, 9 per cent............
Specific exemption .........................................

Net income for taxable year as above ..................
Deduct total exemption as above .........................

$672,631.28
422,445.58

$60,536.82
3,000.00
-------------

63,536.82

422,445.58
63,536.82

Taxable net income .......................................
358,908.76
The construction placed by the commissioner of internal revenue upon
the language of section 201 is that “the amount of the net income in excess
of the deduction" means that the first of the graduated percentages of
invested capital, namely, 15 per cent., is first to be ascertained, and the
deduction is to be made from the amount thereof; and if the deduction is
not in excess of 15 per cent. of the invested capital, the difference between
the amount of the deduction and the 15 per cent. of invested capital is to
be taxed at 20 per cent.
The construction the plaintiff contends should be put upon the language
is that the deduction is to be made from the whole of the net income and
out of the balance of net income remaining an amount not in excess of 15
per cent. of the invested capital is to be taxed at 20 per cent.
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As the defendant computes the tax, the figures and result are as follows:
Taxed
Exemption
Not over—
income
Tax
deducted Balance Rate
15% of invested capital $100,894.69 $63,536.82 $37,357.87 20% $7,471.57
20% of invested capital
33,631.56
8,407.89
33,631.56 25%
25% of invested capital
33,631.56
33,631.56 35% 11,771.04
33% of invested capital
53,810.50
53,810.50 45% 24,214.73
Balance
200,477 27
200,477.27 60% 120,286.36
..............

422,445.58

63,536.82 358,908.76

••••

172,151.59

As the plaintiff computes it the figures and result are as follows:
Not over—
15% of invested
20% of invested
25% of invested
33% of invested
Balance

capital
capital
capital
capital

Taxed
income
$100,894.69
33,631.56
33,631.56
53,810.50
136,940.45
358,908.76

Rate
20%
25%
35%
45%
60%

Tax
$20,178.94
8,407.89
11,771.04
24,214.73
82,164.27
146,736.87

A comparison of the two methods shows that by making the deduction
from the first item of 15 per cent. of invested capital the amount taxed at
the 20 per cent rate is diminished by the amount of the deduction and
the amount taxed at the 60 per cent. rate is increased by the amount of
the deduction, with the result that the plaintiff has been required to pay
the difference between 60 per cent. and 20 per cent, or 40 per cent. tax
upon $63,536.82, the amount of the deduction, or $25,414.72, less the
normal tax of 2 per cent. and 4 per cent., amounting to $1,534.88, leaving
$23,889.84, and that amount the plaintiff claims was unlawfully included
in the assessment and unlawfully collected.
The language of section 201 is at first glance somewhat confusing.
Plausible arguments have been presented by able counsel on both sides
setting forth their opposing contentions as to the meaning of the section.
Does its language mean that the first of the graduated percentages of
tax is to be 20 per cent. upon an amount not in excess of 15 per cent. of
the invested capital out of what remains of the net income after making
the deductions? Or does it mean it is to be 20 per cent. of the difference
between the deduction and 15 per cent. of the invested capital ?
It will be noted that while the paragraph providing for the 20 per
cent. tax places it upon the amount of the net income in excess of the
deduction and not in excess of 15 per cent. of the invested capital the
remaining clauses contain no provision for the deduction. The revenue
office supplies that omission by providing in its regulations that if the 15
per cent of the invested capital is exceeded by the deduction the excess of
deduction is applied to the net paragraph, and so on through the succeed
ing provisions for graduated tax. So that in an illustration set out in
the regulations no tax is charged at all under any of the percentages
except the highest and final rate of 60 per cent. of the net income in excess
of 33 per cent. of the capital. That method is attacked by the plaintiff
upon the ground that such construction prevents uniformity and equality
in the application of the tax, and is therefore in violation of the principles
of law governing taxation.
It is asserted that the language in controversy is ambiguous. It is not
ambiguous in the sense that it can not be determined from its language
that a tax is to be laid upon incomes in excess of normal pre-war profits
and that it is to be based upon certain graduated percentages set out in
the act. If it is ambiguous, its ambiguity consists in the fact that it does
not make it clear by what method the deduction is to be allowed; whether
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the amount of the exemption is to be taken first from the total net income
or only from that part of it which does not exceed 15 per cent. of the
invested capital.
A large part of the difficulty in construing the 20 per cent. paragraph
arises from the fact that the amounts involved are expressed in descriptive
terms and not in figures. If the act taxed the amount of the net income
in excess of $50,000 and not in excess of $100,000, we would have no diffi
culty in understanding that the amount to be taxed was the difference
between $100,000 and $50,000.
We have, however, undisputed in the case, the amount of the net in
come, the amount of the deduction, and, having the invested capital for
the year, we have 15 per cent. of that.
Stating the paragraph with the figures representing the deduction, and
those representing 15 per cent. of the invested capital instead of their
equivalent terms, we have 20 per cent. of the amount of the net income
in excess of $63,536.82 and not in excess of $100,894.69.
If the paragraph is so stated it plainly means that the amount to be
taxed at 20 per cent. is the difference between $100,894.69 and $63,536.82.
In the next paragraph substituting in the same manner, we have 25 per
cent. of the amount of the net income in excess of $100,894.69 and not in
excess of $134,526.26.
As the 20 per cent. paragraph is the only one in which the deduction
is stated, and in the succeeding paragraph the tax is clearly placed upon
the difference in the percentages of invested capital, it is apparent that
it was the intention of Congress by the repeated use of the words “in
excess of” and “not in excess of” to have the same meaning apply to these
words where used in the first paragraph as where used in the subsequent
paragraphs, thus imposing no tax upon the net income up to the amount
of the deduction, but imposing the lowest rate of tax upon the difference
between the deduction and 15 per cent. of the invested capital, imposing
the net tax upon the difference between 15 and 20 per cent. of the invested
capital, and so on, until in the last percentage paragraph the highest rate
of 60 per cent. applies to all net income in excess of 33 per cent. of invested
capital. If there is any ambiguity in the act, it may affect cases where
the deduction exceeds 15 per cent. of the invested capital. In this case
that situation is not present. So that the method adopted by the Com
missioner of Internal Revenue in such case, in allowing the residue of the
deduction not absorbed under the 20 per cent. rate against the next gradu
ated rate and so on until the entire deduction is absorbed, is not before
the court, unless the plaintiff is obliged to pay taxes through lack of
equality and uniformity of application of the law which other taxpayers
escape.
If the question were presented, it would be open to the contention that
inasmuch as the deduction is only provided for in the clause concerning
the 20 per cent. rate, the method adopted by the revenue office is a liberal
construction in favor of the taxpayer who under a strict construction in
favor of the government might be held entitled only to a deduction which
did not exceed 15 per cent. of invested capital.
The tax is imposed, however, not upon stated amounts of income, but
by graduated percentage rates upon graduated percentages of income.
The tax is laid upon the income in excess of what congress considered
represented a reasonable, normal profit made during the pre-war period
and between minimum and maximum percentages is applied to the in
vested capital during the taxable year. Under the designated percentages
uniform rules apply to all corporations alike in similar circumstances
upon their net income if in excess of the deduction whether the invested
capital be great or small, and whether the profits be great or small.
In allowing the deduction, congress has the power to apply it so it will
reduce the tax at any of the graduated rates. By reducing the amount of
tax to be paid at the lower rates, it increases the amount to be paid at the
higher rates, so that the higher rates apply more heavily in proportion to
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the percentage of profits in excess of the pre-war basis; and that is what
congress evidently intended. I fail to see that in making this distinction
congress transcended its powers or that the tax lacks in equality and uni
formity among those on whom the percentage taxes, based on percentages
of income and percentages of invested capital, are imposed.
Nor am I convinced that the plaintiff suffers under any inequality of
burden through having its tax computed under the same rules which apply
to all other corporations in the same circumstances.
Judgment may be entered for the defendant with costs.

Virginia Society of Public Accountants
At a meeting of the Virginia Society of Certified Public Accountants
held September 3, 1921, at Richmond, the following officers were elected:
W. S. Taylor, Norfolk, president; T. Jack Bagby, Richmond, vice-presi
dent; W. R. Tolleth, Norfolk, secretary and treasurer.

Certified Public Accountants of Massachusetts, Inc.
At a meeting of the Certified Public Accountants of Massachusetts, Inc.,
held September 7th, Robert Douglas was elected treasurer to fill the
vacancy caused by the death of Gerald Wyman, and Charles F. Rittenhouse
was elected a member of the executive committee.
Washington Society of Certified Public Accountants
At the annual meeting of the Washington Society of Certified Public
Accountants held in Seattle August 27th, the following officers were
elected: A. S. Hansen, president; J. P. Robertson, vice-president; E. P.
Jarvis, secretary and treasurer; Carl G. Prestrud, auditor. The directors
are James P. Robertson, William McAdam, Pearce C. Davis, A. S. Hansen
and E. P. Jarvis.

Smith, Robertson & Co. announce the removal of their Seattle office to
1121-4 White building.
Raymond L. Beales and William P. Gibson announce the formation
of a partnership under the firm name of Beales & Gibson, with offices
at 165 Broadway, New York.

Frederick J. Smith and Frederick E. Herbert announce the formation
of a partnership under the firm name of Smith, Herbert & Co., with
offices at 800 Broad street, Newark, New Jersey.
W. R. Mackenzie & Son of Portland, Oregon, announce the opening
of an office at 61 Broadway, New York, under the management of Charles
Arthur Mackenzie.

Frederick MacLeod announces the opening of an office for the practice
of accountancy in Kohl building, San Francisco, California.
Billings, Woodford & Co. announce the opening of an office in the
Allyn House, Hartford, Connecticut.
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